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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW- EVIDENCE - HEARSAY- RESIDUUM
RULE-An equally divided Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has
held that uncorroborated hearsay evidence alone can support a
factual finding in an administrative hearing if the proponent
establishes some foundation for the hearsay's reliability or relia-
bility is apparent on its face.
Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v. Ceja, 493 Pa.
584, 427 A.2d 631 (1981).
In January, 1977, Theresa J. Ceja was dismissed from her job
with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Reve-
nue.1 Subsequently, she was denied unemployment benefits upon
a finding that she had been discharged for willful misconduct
She appealed and, after a hearing before a referee, was again
denied benefits.' The Unemployment Compensation Board of Re-
view made certain findings of fact and affirmed the referee's
decision, concluding that Ceja's conduct was clearly insubordi-
nate and rose to the level of willful misconduct.' On appeal, the
1. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review v. Ceja, 493 Pa. 584, 427
A.2d 631, 632 (1981). Ceja had been warned repeatedly about her disruptive con-
duct in her work area and her refusal to follow instructions. Her employer
dismissed her after an incident in which she directed profane and abusive
language at her supervisor. Id.
2. I. Section 402(e) of the Unemployment Compensation Law, as amended,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 802(e) (Purdon 1964) provides: "An employee shall be
ineligible for compensation for any week -... (e) In which his unemployment is
due to his discharge or temporary suspension from work for willfull misconduct
connect with his work, irrespective of whether or not such work is 'employ-
ment' as defined in this act."
3. 493 Pa. at 590-91, 427 A.2d at 632.
4. Id. at 591, 427 A.2d at 632. At the compensation hearing below, several
memoranda and letters pertaining to the appellant's employment history were
offered into evidence by her employer without any formal objection by the ap-
pellant, who was not represented by counsel. This evidence included notices of
suspension based upon the appellant's alleged disruptive behavior and insubor-
dination. The documents presented by the employer went on to allege that the
appellant called her supervisor an "S.O.B." The employer also presented two
eyewitness accounts of the appellant's behavior. The appellant explicitly denied
calling her supervisor an "S.O.B." and stated that the documents presented
against her were misleading and inaccurate. At no time did the employer call
any witness with first-hand knowledge of the events in dispute or of the way in




commonwealth court reversed the Board's decision and held that
the commonwealth had failed to sustain its burden of proving
willful misconduct because it had presented only uncorroborated
hearsay evidence.5
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted allocatur and af-
firmed the commonwealth court's order on different grounds.'
The court held, however, that uncorroborated hearsay evidence,
if reliable, may support an administrative decision The court
formulated guidelines for applying a "common sense analysis" to
test the reliability of hearsay evidence on a case-by-case basis
rather than by an technical or rigid standard.'
Justice Kauffman delivered a plurality opinion' in which he
held that the documents offered by the employer failed to meet
the requirements of the Uniform Business Records as Evidence
Act. ° Thus, Justice Kauffman observed that because the com-
5. Ceja v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 41 Pa. Commw.
487, 399 A.2d 807 (1979). The court relied on its decision in Walker v. Unem-
ployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 27 Pa. Commw. 522, 367 A.2d 366 (1976),
which held that hearsay, even though admitted without objection, could not sup-
port a Board of Review finding unless it was corroborated by competent evid-
ence. Id. at 527, 367 A.2d at 370.
6. 493 Pa. at 591, 427 A.2d at 633.
7. Id. at 607-08, 427 A.2d at 641-42.
8. Id at 608-09, 427 A.2d at 642.
9. Id. at 590, 427 A.2d at 632. Chief Justice O'Brien and Justice Nix joined
in the plurality opinion.
10. Id. at 593, 427 A.2d at 633. The Uniform Business Records as Evidence
Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, §§ 91(a)-91(d) (Purdon 1958) [hereinafter cited as
UBREA], subsequently was repealed and reenacted as 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 6108 (1981). At the time of the compensation hearing, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, §
91(b) provided:
A record of an act, condition or event shall, insofar as relevant, be compe-
tent evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its
identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the regular
course of the business at or near the time of the act, condition or event,
and if, in the opinion of the court, the sources of information, method and
time of preparation were such as to justify its admission.
Id. Justice Kauffman went on to note that the employer's attorney introduced
the documents as the employer's total case without indicating that he had any
personal knowledge of the events described in the documents. 493 Pa. at 593,
427 A.2d at 633. Because no attempt was made to show that the documents
were prepared in the regular course of business or that they originated close to
the time of the incidents they described, Justice Kauffman ruled that the
employer failed to lay any foundation for introduction of the documents as
business records under the UBREA exception to the hearsay rule. Id. at 593,
427 A.2d at 634.
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comwealth court properly treated the documents as uncorrobor-
ated hearsay, it correctly applied the standards set forth in
Walker v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review 1 and
properly rejected the uncorroborated hearsay as the sole basis
for a finding of fact. 2 He noted that according to Walker, prop-
erly objected-to hearsay evidence is not competent evidence to
support a finding of the Board; and hearsay evidence admitted
without objection may support a finding, but only if it is corrob-
orated by some competent evidence on the record.
Justice Kauffman began an examination of the Walker rule by
noting that the civil jury trial rules of evidence are less useful
and at times counterproductive when applied to administrative
proceedings. 4 He observed that the purpose of an administrative
agency is to efficiently carry out legislative policies through ad-
judication, and that this can be achieved only if agencies receive
all the relevant and probative evidence that could contribute to
an informed decision." He also noted that it would be unrealistic
to expect administrative tribunals to apply the strict exclu-
sionary rules of evidence. 6
11. 27 Pa. Commw. 522, 367 A.2d 366 (1976).
12. 493 Pa. at 593, 427 A.2d at 634. The lower court held that the common-
wealth had failed to meet its burden of proving willful misconduct. See McLean
v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 476 Pa. 617, 383 A.2d 533 (1978)
(burden of proving willful misconduct is on the employer).
13. 493 Pa. at 601, 427 A.2d at 637-38. See Walker, 27 Pa. Commw. at 527,
367 A.2d at 370.
14. 493 Pa. at 594, 427 A.2d at 634. See 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 46, at
31 (3d ed. 1940).
15. 493 Pa. at 594, 427 A.2d at 634. Justice Kauffman cited Section 505 of
the Pennsylvania Administrative Agency Law, 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 505
(1981) which provides: "Agencies shall not be bound by technical rules of evi-
Oence at agency hearings and all relevant evidence of reasonably probative
value may be received. Reasonable examination and cross-examination shall be
permitted." As reflecting this consideration at the time of the unemployment
compensation hearing in Ceja, this provision appeared at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71,
§ 1710.32 (Purdon 1962).
16. 493 Pa. at 595, 427 A.2d at 634. See R. BENJAMIN, ADMINISTRATIVE AD-
JUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK, 174-175 (1942). See WIGMORE, supra
note 14, at 36, which provides:
[T]he jury-trial system of Evidence-rules cannot be imposed upon admin-
istrative tribunals without imposing the lawyers also upon them; and this
would be the heaviest calamity. The complex mass of Evidence-rules
cannot be applied except by technically trained lawyers; and, furthermore,
many of these technical lawyers will belong to the over-technical type. No
one can wish that the petty snarling contentiousness over technicalities of
1982] 345
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However, Justice Kauffman recognized that the notion of fair-
ness and the due process rights of the litigants must be con-
sidered. He noted that the most common due process issue raised
in judicial review of agency decisions is whether and how to admit
hearsay and how to weigh it." Justice Kauffman observed that
despite the importance of the issue, its resolution in various jur-
isdictions has not been uniform. 8
Justice Kauffman cited Professor McCormick's argument that
restrictions against the admission of hearsay in administrative
tribunals should be eliminated.' 9 After noting some of the con-
cerns and competing interests recognized by McCormick, Justice
Kauffman observed that the seminal Pennsylvania case attempt-
ing to reconcile them was McCauley v. Imperial Woolen Co.,1° a
workmen's compensation case, which held that a finding must be
based on relevant and competent evidence of sound, probative
character.2 He stated that the McCauley holding reiterated a
rule of law first pronounced by the New York Court of Appeals
in Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co.,' another workmen's compen-
sation case. Knickerbocker articulated the "legal residuum rule,"
which stipulates that an agency can accept any evidence offered,
but that ultimately a decision must be supported by a residuum
of legal evidence.23
trial tactics, so typical of jury-trial, should be transferred to the adminis-
trative tribunals. And yet, how can the system be transferred without
transferring the only persons who can use it?
Id. (emphasis in original).
17. 493 Pa. at 596, 427 A.2d at 635.
18. Id.
19. Id. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 350 (2d
ed. 1972). Professor McCormick argues strongly for abolishing the exclusionary
restrictions against admitting hearsay evidence in administrative proceedings
because these restraints have nothing to do with the hearsay's probative value.
McCormick points out that there should be no technical distinction between
hearsay and non-hearsay evidence because both types range from the least to
the most reliable forms of evidence. He quotes Professor Davis's opinion that
"the guide should be a judgment about the reliability of particular evidence in a
particular record in particular circumstances, not the technical hearsay rule with
all its complex exceptions." Id. at 842 (quoting Davis, Hearsay in Administrative
Hearings, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 689, 689 (1964)). Furthermore, McCormick
argues that it is illogical to require a trial examiner to refuse to admit hearsay
when there is no jury to protect and the examiner will be exposed to the
evidence whether he admits or exclusdes it. Id.
20. 261 Pa. 312, 104 A. 617 (1918).
21. Id. at 326, 104 A. at 622.
22. 218 NY. 435, 113 N.E. 507 (1916).
23. Id. at 440, 113 N.E. at 509.
346 [Vol. 20:343
Recent Decisions
Justice Kauffman noted that this residuum rule has persisted
in a number of jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania,24 and that
despite the rule's purpose of ensuring fairness in administrative
hearings, it has been strongly criticized by scholars.25 Further-
more, Justice Kauffman concluded that the residuum rule actually
imposes a stricter evidentiary standard than that utilized in jury
trials because the rule renders all hearsay ineffective unless cor-
roborated, ignoring its potential reliability.2"
Justice Kauffman cited Professor Davis's proposal that adminis-
trative agencies be given more discretion to determine on a case-
by-case basis whether or not the evidence before them is reliable
even though inadmissible in a jury trial.' Justice Kauffman also
noted that Judge Learned Hand advocated administrative reli-
ance on hearsay evidence when there is no better evidence avail-
able and such evidence is the kind on which responsible persons
are accustomed to rely in serious affairs.28 Justice Kauffman
cited Davis's contention that there exists a need for a more ra-
tional standard for evaluating evidence in administrative pro-
ceedings based on the variable circustances of each case, not
solely on whether the hearsay is corroborated or not."
24. 493 Pa. at 598, 427 A.2d at 636. See infra note 85 and accompanying
text.
25. 493 Pa. at 598, 427 A.2d at 636. The residuum rule reflects a concern
for claimant's right to confrontation and cross-examination.
26. Id. at 599, 427 A.2d at 637. See MCCORMICK, supra note 19, at 848.
Unobjected-to hearsay is competent evidence in jury trials. 493 Pa. at 601, 427
A.2d at 638.
27. Id at 600-01, 427 A.2d at 637. See 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 14.10 (1958).
28. 493 Pa. at 599-600, 427 A.2d at 637. See NLRB v. Remington Rand, 94
F.2d 862 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 576 (1938). In Remington Rand Judge
Learned Hand stated that:
[The examiner] did indeed admit much that would have been excluded at
common law, but the act specifically so provides . . . no doubt, that does
not mean that mere rumor will serve to "support" a finding, but hearsay
may do so, at least if more is not conveniently available, and if in the end
the finding is supported by the kind of evidence on which responsible per-
sons are accustomed to rely in serious affairs.
Id. at 873. Justice Kauffman then noted that Judge Hand later applied this for-
mulation to the residuum rule in United States v. Costello, 221 F.2d 668 (2d Cir.
1955), which held that it is illogical to require that hearsay must be sup-
plemented by some first-hand evidence in order to support a finding. Id. at
677-78.
29. 493 Pa. at 600-01, 427 A.2d 637. See DAVIS, supra note 27, § 14.13 which
states that:
[t]he reliability of evidence cannot be adequately judged by wholesale
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Justice Kauffman then noted that the Pennsylvania residuum
rule is embodied in the two-part test set forth in Walker." While
Justice Kauffman found the Walker objective of preventing ad-
ministrative decisions based on insubstantial evidence laudable,
he maintained that this goal could be attained much more effi-
ciently by adopting simple guidelines, rather then inflexible,
mechanical standards, for determining whether the evidence is
reliable enough to support a finding. 1 Thus, he noted that his
criticism of Walker is similar to criticisms of the residuum rule.
He stated that the Walker rule hampers the administrative deci-
sion-making process and fails to thoroughly protect the due pro-
cess rights of litigants before the agency.32 As a result, Justice
Kauffman concluded that the Walker standard is too rigid and in-
definite and that the court should formulate more appropriate
guidelines.33
thinking that ignores circumstances but must be determined in the light
of variable circumstances, including the supporting evidence or lack of it,
the purpose of the proceeding, the practical consequences of a finding
either way, the degree of precision needed, the degree of efficacy of cross-
examination with respect to a hearsay declaration, and many other such
factors.
Id
30. 493 Pa. at 601, 427 A.2d at 637-38. See supra text accompanying note
13. Justice Kauffman noted that the Board of Review's criticism of Walker's
holding, that unobjected-to hearsay alone is not competent, is not in accord with
the precedent cited in Walker. 493 Pa. at 601, 427 A.2d at 638. He stated,
however, that the Board's criticism was not basic to the inherent weaknesses of
the residuum rule, but rather demonstrated the artifical nature of the Walker
rule itself in that it fails to distinguish reliable from unreliable hearsay. Justice
Kauffman noted that the first part of the Walker rule preserves the technical
distinction between objected-to and unobjected-to hearsay, but that the second
part distorts the traditional standard regarding competency of unobjected-to
hearsay by requiring the hearsay to be corroborated. Id. at 601-02, 427 A.2d at
638.
31. Id at 602, 427 A.2d at 638.
32. Id Justice Kauffman's first criticism of the Walker rule was that it
fails to distinguish between reliable and unreliable hearsay, thus hampering the
administrative decision-making process. His second criticism is that it equally
fails to protect a claimant's due process rights, because unobjected-to hearsay,
if corroborated, no matter how unreliable, and no matter how slight the legal
evidence, may provide the substantial evidence needed to support an adminis-
trative finding. Further, Justice Kauffman observed that corroboration in and
of itself is not dispositive of the issue of reliability. He noted that if it is avail-
able, corroboration may be a factor in determing reliability, but that corrobora-




Justice Kauffman began a survey of some of the standards for
administrative fact-finding that have been adopted by noting
that some jurisdictions have adopted Judge Hand's formulation.34
Next, he cited the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),35 which
requires reliable, probative and substantial evidence and allows
any oral or documentary evidence to be admitted as long as it is
not irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious."
Justice Kauffman noted that the Supreme Court attempted to
define the terms "reliable" and "substantial" evidence in Consoli-
dated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 7 which adotped a definition similar
in form to Judge Hand's guidelines. 38 He pointed out, however,
that the Consolidated Edison Court also stated that mere uncor-
roborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evi-
dence, and that the case has been used to support the various
forms of the residuum rule in the state and federal courts.39
Justice Kauffman observed that the substantial evidence stan-
dard was more accurately explained in Richardson v. Perales,° a
later Supreme Court case which defined material which failed to
constitute substantial evidence as that which lacks any rational,
probative force." Further, he noted that the Perales Court's
34. Id at 603, 427 A.2d at 628-29 (citing Reynolds Metals Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 98 Ariz. 97, 402 P.2d 414 (1965)). See supra text accompanying note 28.
35. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1976).
36. 493 Pa. at 603, 427 A.2d at 639. Section 556(d) of the APA provides:
Any oral or documentary evidence may be received, but the agency as a
matter of policy shall provide for the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial
or unduly repetitious evidence. A sanction may not be imposed ... except
as supported by and in accordance with the reliable, probative and sub-
stantial evidence .... A party is entitled to present his case or defense
by oral or documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to con-
duct such cross-examination as may be required for a full and true disclos-
ure of the facts.
5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1976). See Neumann v. Mayor of Baltimore, 251 Md. 92, 246
A.2d 583 (1968) (adopted APA standard and held that hearsay may be the sole
basis of an administrative decision if it has sufficient probative value).
37. 305 U.S. 197 (1938).
38. 493 Pa. at 603, 427 A.2d at 639.
39. Id
40. 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
41. 493 Pa. at 604, 427 A.2d at 639. Justice Kauffman noted that in Perales,
the plaintiff was denied social security disability benefits on the basis of
medical reports which, although being examples of hearsay, exhibited sufficient
circumstantial guarantees of reliability. He pointed out that the medical reports
in Perales were the expert opinions of licensed physicians, were prepared immed-
iately after the examination, were unbiased, and thus were found to be highly
3491982]
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holding, that in some administrative proceedings circumstantial
guarantees of reliability will be sufficient to make uncor-
roborated hearsay evidence competent, has been followed in at
least one other recent federal case. 2
Justice Kauffman observed that in a court of law hearsay may
be competent if it fits into any of the recognized exceptions to
the rule and that once evidence is admitted under a recognized
exception, it is given full probative weight." He also noted that
the competency of uncorroborated hearsay was recognized under
the common law. 4 He concluded, therefore, that hearsay could be
substantial evidence in support of an administrative finding if it
falls within the statutory or common law exceptions to the
technical hearsay rule or if it has circumstantial guarantees of
reliability equivalent to those implicit in the recognized excep-
tions. "'5
reliable. However, Justice Kuffman observed that the Perales Court did not
clarify whether the above guarantees, standing alone, would have warranted
the reliability of the medical reports because the claimant's failure to exercise
his right to subpoena the examining physicians could have been instrumental in
persuading the Court to consider the documents "substantial evidence." Id. at
604-05, 427 A.2d at 639-40.
42. Id. at 605, 427 A.2d at 640. See Calhoun v. Bailar, 626 F.2d 145 (9th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3033 (1981) (rejecting any per se rule holding that
hearsay can never be substantial evidence and holding that hearsay will be ad-
missible in administrative proceedings if it is reliable and has probative worth).
43. 493 Pa. at 606-07, 427 A.2d at 640-41. Justice Kauffman cited Rule
803(24) of the Federal Rules of Evidence which makes hearsay competent if:
not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court
determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material
fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is of-
fered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through
reasonable efforts; and.(C) the general purposes of these rules and the in-
terests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into
evidence.
FED. R. EVID. 803(24). 493 Pa. at 606 n.27, 427 A.2d at 640 n.27.
44. Id. at 607, 427 A.2d at 641.
45. Id. Justice Kauffman cited 11 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE §
803(24)[71, at 208 (2d ed. 1976), in which it is noted:
A mechanical and unreasoned application of the hearsay rule that
denies vital, trustworthy evidence is not warranted. In referring to cir-
cumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness which are equivalent to those
which support the specifically enumerated exceptions, Rules 803(24) and
804(5) are not referring to any one specific quantifiable degree of trust-
worthiness. Within the specifically authorized exceptions there is a great
variation in the level of reliability.
... Each case must be judged on its own unique facts and the issue of
[Vol. 20:343
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While noting that reliability must be judged on a case-by-case
basis, Justice Kauffman stated that several factors are signifi-
cant in the determination to base a decision solely on hearsay: (1)
whether the hearsay is corroborated," (2) the type of hearsay of-
fered, 7 and (3) the necessity of using the hearsay. 8 Thus, he
reasoned that a simple common sense analysis, employing recog-
nized hearsay exceptions or equivalent circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness to test the reliability of hearsay evidence,
would be appropriate in informal administrative settings.'9
Justice Kauffman then noted that a standard of trustworthi-
ness and necessity for the use of hearsay to support findings of
fact in administrative settings, including a reasonable opportunity
to challenge the reliability of any adverse hearsay evidence, satis-
fies due process requirements." What constitutes a reasonable
opportunity will depend, Justice Kauffman observed, on the
claimant's interest in avoiding grievous loss and the government's
interest in a summary adjudication.51
admissibility should be determined in light of the basic purposes of the
rules of evidence, which, according to Rule 102, are to facilitate truth
ascertainment in order fairly to resolve controversies brought to the
courts for adjudication.
Id
46. 493 Pa. at 607, 427 A.2d at 641. Other factors cited were whether the
hearsay statements are written or oral; signed or anonymous; sworn or un-
sworn; or whether the hearsay declarant is disinterested or biased. Id.
47. Id Justice Kauffman observed that some documents, such as reports
from licensed professionals, are more prone to be trustworthy than documents
of a more general and subjective nature. Id. at 607-08, 427 A.2d at 641.
48. Id at 608, 427 A.2d at 641. It must be determined whether the hearsay
declarant is available to testify, or if not, whether better evidence is available.
Id
49. 1d at 608-09, 427 A.2d at 642.
50. Id at 609, 427 A.2d at 642 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1969);
MCCORMICK, supra note 19, at 845-46). See infra note 56.
51. 493 Pa. at 609-10, 427 A.2d at 642. Justice Kauffman also noted that in
Perales, the claimant's reasonable opportunity to attack the hearsay documents
consisted of the right to subpoena the declarants, while in other cases a reason-
able opportunity could consist of as little as the hearing officer's probing the ad-
verse party to determine the extent and credibility of the challenge. He further
observed that if the referee concludes that the party's challenge raises a
credibility question regarding the hearsay evidence, the referee may then exer-
cise his power to subpoena the declarant. Id at 610, 427 A.2d at 642. Section
506 of the Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
43, § 826 (Purdon 1964) provides that the referee has the power to subpoena the
declarant. Justice Kauffman noted that this decision on the referee's part varies
according to the circumstances of each hearing. 493 Pa. at 610, 427 A.2d at 642.
1982]
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Justice Kauffman concluded that the proper standard must
serve the government's interest in simple and routine adminis-
trative adjudication; the interest of all concerned parties in guar-
anteeing the proper evaluation of the reliability of the hearsay
evidence; and the claimant's interest in preserving his due pro-
cess right to have reasonable opportunities to challenge the relia-
bility of any adverse evidence.2 He rejected any purely technical
distinction between objected-to and unobjected-to hearsay, no-
ting that such a rigid rule would fail to separate evidence that is
reliable and probative from that which has little if any probative
value. He reasoned, therefore, that any relevant and reliable
evidence, regardless of whether corroborated or not, is capable
of supporting an administrative finding. 3
Justice Kauffman adopted guidelines stipulating that all hear-
say evidence, even if objected to, is generally admissible in an
administrative hearing. To ensure reliability and competency,
Justice Kauffman stated, hearsay evidence must fall within a
common law or statutory exception to the hearsay rule or else
have equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness
and be more probative of the point for which it is offered than
any other evidence which is reasonabley available. He also re-
quired that the hearsay proponent prove the competency of the
evidence he offers before it can be used to support a finding. 4
Justice Kauffman noted that in administering the above
guidelines, fairness, must be the touchstone. Referring to the
regulations promulgated pursuant to the Pennsylvania Ad-
ministrative Agency Law,5" he observed that when a party con-
tradicts hearsay, the referee must give him a reasonable oppor-
tunity to attack the reliability of the evidence at the time it is
admitted. Regardless of whether or not the adverse party in-
itiates such a challenge, Justice Kauffman noted that there must
52. Id at 610, 427 A.2d at 642-43.
53. Id at 610-11, 427 A.2d at 643.
54. Id at 611, 427 A.2d at 643.
55. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.35 (Purdon 1962) (current version at 2
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 102(a) (Purdon 1981)). The regulation cited by Justice
Kauffman provides:
(a) In any hearing the tribunal may examine the parties and their
witnesses. Where a party is not represented by counsel the tribunal
before whom the hearing is being held should advise him as to his rights,
aid him in examining and cross-examining witnesses, and give him every
assistance compatible with the impartial discharge of its offical duties.
34 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 101.21 (Shepard's 1981).
352 [Vol. 20:343
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be some foundation for the hearsay's reliability unless it is
reliable on its face.5" He stated that the referee is required to
set forth the evidentiary basis for his decision, whether it be live
testimony (or other direct evidence), hearsay alone, or a combina-
tion of the two."
Reviewing the record in the instant case, Justice Kauffman
concluded that the referee's conduct at the hearing below fell
short of the pertinent administrative rules and common law re-
quirements. Because Ceja was given no real opportunity to cross-
examine or challenge the employer's hearsay documents, which
were the sole basis of the employer's case, the referee failed to
meet the standards of the Board's own regulations." Justice
Kauffman noted that the referee at no time tested the reliability
of the employer's evidence nor did the referee aid the claimant in
her efforts to articulate a challenge to the evidence.59
56. 493 Pa. at 612, 427 A.2d at 643. Justice Kauffman stated that if the
hearsay's reliability is questionable due to a challenge by the claimant or the
lack of a foundation, then the referee must determine if live testimony is needed.
I& Justice Kauffman distinguished Perales, see supra text accompanying notes
40 & 41, where the hearsay declarants had no interest adverse to the claimant,
from Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1969), and the instant case, where the
veracity of the declarants was the key issue, thus enhancing the need for con-
frontation and cross-examination. Furthermore, he noted that in such cases the
referee has a duty to determine whether additional testimony is needed to
reach an informed decision, and if so, the referee or the Board must call such
additional witnesses. 432 Pa. at 612, 427 A.2d at 643. See Phillips v. Unemploy-
ment Compensation Bd. of Review, 152 Pa. Super. 75, 30 A.2d 718, 723 (1943)
(when employer fails to appear at unemployment compensation proceeding and
additional testimony is required, it is the duty of the referee or Board to call
witnesses who can supply such testimony).
57. 493 Pa. at 612, 427 A.2d at 643-44.
58. Id at 612, 427 A.2d at 644.
59. Id. When the employer's representative began introducing exhibits, Ceja
attempted to interrupt the proceedings, but was abruptly cut off by the referee.
Justice Kauffman reasoned that the referee's conduct may have actually dis-
couraged her from making further attempts to question the reliability of the ad-
verse evidence because she remained quite while the employer subsequently in-
troduced 12 more exhibits into evidence. Justice Kauffman emphasized that
under the applicable statute, the referee should be expected to ask an un-
counseled claimant whether he or she wants to object to the introduction of
each exhibit as it is being offered into evidence. He noted that the referee did
not attempt to ascertain the appelant's view regarding the credibility of the ex-
hibits. He observed that after all of the exhibits were introduced into evidence,
the appellant again tried to challenge the adverse evidence, but the referee, in-
stead of aiding the claimant in her attempt to challenge the employer's evi-
dence, only appeared to reinforce the employer's case by cross-examining the
claimant with the aid of the employer's counsel. Id
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Thus, Justice Kauffman concluded that the commonwealth's
documents lacked reliability and trustworthiness because they
were unsworn, subjective statements prepared solely at the re-
quest of the employer and directly contradicted by Ceja's live
testimony."0 Moreover, he noted that the declarants may have
been biased against Ceja, and that because the credibility of the
declarants was the key issue in dispute, there should have been
a demonstration of the necessity for relying solely upon the hear-
say documents.,1 Therefore, he affirmed the order of the com-
monwealth court, concluding that the employer failed to meet its
burden of proving willful misconduct.62
Justice Roberts, in a concurring opinion, agreed that the com-
monwealth court order should be affirmed because the Board of
Review presented uncorroborated hearsay evidence and failed to
meet its burden of proving willful misconduct on the part of the
appellant." He noted that Justice Kauffman reached this result by
employing his newly announed administrative guidelines, which
Justice Roberts deemed unnecessary to the affirmance of the
commonwealth court's order and an invitation to confusion and
lack of uniformity." Further, he stated not only that Justice
Kauffman provided no guidance about how the guidelines should
be applied, but that the result reached by the court was not man-
dated by a proper application of the guidelines to the facts of the
instant case." He postulated that under Justice Kauffman's
guidelines, each decision by an administrative tribunal regarding
the sufficiency of hearsay evidence would be subject to a possi-
ble appeal to determine if the court had applied the proper com-
mon sense, resulting in widely disparate and irreconcilable ad-
ministrative rulings.66
60. Id. at 613-14, 427 A.2d at 644.
61. Id
62. Id
63. Id at 614, 427 A.2d at 645 (Roberts, J., concurring). Justices Larsen
and Flaherty joined in the opinion.
64. Id at 614-15, 427 A.2d at 645 (Roberts, J., concurring).
65. Id at 615, 427 A.2d at 645 (Roberts, J., concurring). Justice Roberts
argued that a proper application of these guidelines to the facts of the instant
case would clearly result in a reversal, rather than an affirmance of the com-
monwealth court's order because the documents presented by the common-
wealth had "some foundation" for their reliability. He noted that the employer's
documents "were prepared close in time to the events they purport to relate,
were kept as part of the employer's records and included two eyewitness ac-




Justice Roberts noted that these guidelines discard the com-
monwealth's longstanding position that administrative findings
must be supported by some evidence that would be admissible
over objection in a court of law.67 He also stated that an.applica-
tion of the suggested guidelines would deny claimants in admin-
istrative proceedings the same due process protections regarding
the admissibility of hearsay evidence that are given to civil jury
trial litigants. - He urged that the need for routine and summary
adjudication in administrative proceedings is outweighed by the
need to protect a claimant's due process rights. Justice Roberts
noted that where the claimant is not represented by counsel and
does not object to hearsay evidence, the fairness of the adminis-
trative process requries that a decision cannot be based solely
upon hearsay."9 Thus, in order to base a decision on hearsay
evidence, Justice Roberts emphasized, the hearsay must be cor-
roborated by legally competent evidence.7"
Because an administrative adjudication need only be supported
by "substantial evidence" to avoid judicial review,71 Justice
Roberts stressed the claimant's need for protection when the de-
cision maker relies solely on unsworn statements that were not
subject to cross-examination. 2 He concluded that, to provide this
67. Id at 616, 427 A.2d at 645 (Roberts, J., concurring). See, e.g., McCauley
v. Imperial Woolen, Co., 261 Pa. 312, 104 A. 617 (1918); Glen Alden Coal Co. v.
Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 168 Pa. Super. 534, 79 A.2d 796
(1951); Walker v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 27 Pa. Commw.
522, 367 A.2d 366 (1976); Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review v. Stiles,
19 Pa. Commw. 38, 340 A.2d 594 (1975); Pellegrino v. Unemployment Compensa-
tion Bd. of Review, 8 Pa. Commw. 486, 303 A.2d 875 (1973).
68. 493 Pa. at 616, 426 A.2d 645 (Roberts, J., concurring). Justice Roberts
stated that administrative hearings are not routine to the claimant because
these proceedings can determine the claimant's very livelihood. Id. at 616, 427
A.2d at 645-46 (Roberts, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 616, 427 A.2d at 646 (Roberts, J., concurring).
70. Id Justice Roberts pointed out that many claimants have no under-
standing of the technical rules of evidence. Id
71. See MCCORMICK, supra note 19, § 349, at 838.
72. 493 Pa. at 617, 427 A.2d at 646 (Roberts, J., concurring). Justice
Roberts noted that a claimant is denied the opportunity to effectively challenge
hearsay evidence unless he can cross-examine his accusers and that when not
afforded this opportunity, he can only counter with denials which have less
probative effect. Id
The importance of the right to cross-examination is illustrated by comparing
Peters v. United States, 408 F.2d 719 (Ct. Cl. 1969) with Jacobowitz v. United
States, 424 F.2d 555 (Ct. Cl. 1970). In Peters, ex parte hearsay statements of
persons who had bribed the plaintiff regarding his official duties, which were
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protection, present administrative rules of evidence have always
required that an agency adjudication be based on competent evi-
dence subject to a claimant's right of cross-examination.73
Justice Roberts stated that Richardson v. Perales does not
support Justice Kauffman's position that hearsay alone can sup-
port a decision adverse to the claimant in all administrative pro-
ceedings because the special conditions which were present in
Perales are not present here. 4 Moreover, he also noted that it is
contrary to our legal principles to require a claimant to call
adverse witnesses because the burden of proving willful miscon-
duct is on the employer, who must establish his own case.75
Justice Roberts concluded that because the admission of hear-
say is a denial of the constitutional rights of confrontation and
cross-examination, any modification of existing rules against
hearsay should be made cautiously, if at all."
Justice Flaherty filed a separate concurring opinion, agreeing
only with the result reached by the plurality opinion.7 He agreed
that in some instances hearsay would be admissible in an admin-
istrative proceeding, but he limited these instances to situations
where the hearsay evidence falls under a common law or statu-
tory exception to the hearsay rule or where reports, opinions,
and statements of charge are submitted by licensed profes-
sionals."8 Justice Flaherty concluded that the new guidelines
the government's sole evidence and to which plaintiff objected, had sufficient
probative value to support the plaintiff's termination from his job by an admin-
istrative agency. 408 F.2d at 723-24. By comparison, Jacobowitz held that hear-
say evidence produced by the government regarding the discharge of an Internal
Revenue Service employee was not substantial evidence, irrespective of the def-
inition or test used, where such evidence was contradicted by direct, legal and
competent evidence at the hearing, and where it was not the type of relevant
evidence a reasonable mind would accept as the basis for a decision. 424 F.2d at
562-63.
73. 493 Pa. at 617, 427 A.2d at 646 (Roberts, J., concurring).
74. Id Justice Roberts distinguished Perales, where the documents were
recognized as unbiased from Ceja, where the credibility and veracity of the
authors of the documents were central to the dispute. Moreover, in Perales, the
claimant had a right to subpoena the hearsay declarants whereas in the instant
case, the appellant had no such right. Id at 617-18, 427 A.2d at 646 (Roberts, J.,
concurring).
75. Id at 618, 427 A.2d at 647 (Roberts, J., concurring).
76. Id Furthermore, Justice Roberts held that because no error was com-
mitted below, this case was not the proper vehicle for modifying the hearsay
rules nor did Justice Kauffman's opinion provide the needed direction. Id




adopted in the plurality opinion are contrary to centuries of tra-
dition and admonished that a claimant's fundamental due process
rights require that no determination be based solely upon hear-
say.7 9
The residuum rule requires a reviewing court to set aside an
administrative finding unless it is supported by some evidence
that would be admissible in a jury trial. Under the rule, hearsay
evidence alone cannot support an administrative decision, re-
gardless of how reliable the evidence may appear to the agency
and notwithstanding the evidence or lack of evidence presented
by the other side.80
The residuum rule can be traced to a 1916 New York Court of
Appeals decision, Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co.,8 which held
that although the Workmen's Compensation Commission could
accept any evidence presented before it, "still in the end there
must be a residuum of legal evidence to support the claim before
an award can be made."8 In Pennsylvania, the residuum rule was
first articulated in 1918 in McCauley v. Imperial Woolen Co.,3
and evolved into the two-part Walker rule,84 rejected by the Ceja
court.
The residuum rule is followed by the vast majority of state
courts that have ruled on the question of the admissibility of
hearsay evidence in an administrative proceeding. 5 Only a few
79. Id.
80. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 14.07 (3d ed. 1972).
81. 218 N.Y. 435, 113 N.E. 507 (1916).
82. Id. at 440, 113 N.E. at 509.
83. 261 Pa. 312, 104 A. 617 (1918). See supra text accompanying note 20.
84. See supra note 11.
85. See North Ala. Motor Express, v. Rookis, 244 Ala. 139, 12 So. 2d 183
(1943); Libby v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 12 Alaska 584 (D. Alaska 1950), aff'd, 191
F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 913 (1952); Walker v. City of San
Gabriel, 20 Cal. 2d 879, 129 P.2d 349 (1942); Johnson v. Indus. Comm'n of Colo.,
137 Colo. 591, 328 P.2d 384 (1958); Wallace v. Unemployment Compensation Bd.,
294 A.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Geegan v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n,
45 Del. 513, 76 A.2d 116 (1950); Application of Citizens Utils. Co., 82 Idaho 208,
351 P.2d 487 (1960); Menning v. Department of Registration & Educ., 14 Ill. 2d
553, 153 N.E.2d 52 (1958); De Long v. State Highway Comm'n, 229 Iowa 700, 295
N.W. 91 (1940); Cabe v. Campbellsville, 385 S.W.2d 51 (Ky. 1964); Gardere v.
Brown, 170 So. 2d 758 (La. App. 1964); Goldthwaite v. Sheraton Restaurant, 154
Me. 214, 145 A.2d 362 (1958); Sinclair v. Director of Div. of Employment Sec.,
331 Mass. 101, 117 N.E.2d 164 (1954); Simpson v. Matthes, 343 Mich. 125, 72
N.W.2d 64 (1955); Sabes v. City of Minneapolis, 265 Minn. 166, 120 N.W.2d 871
(1963); Dittmeier v. Missouri Real Estate Comm'n, 237 S.W.2d 201 (Mo. App.
1951); Weston v. State, 60 N.J. 36, 286 A.2d 43 (1972); Willoughby v. Bd. of
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jurisdictions have expressly abolished the rule and very few of
the cases in these jurisdictions have provided guidelines for up-
holding administrative reliance on hearsay evidence." On the
Veterinary Examines, 82 N.M. 443, 483 P.2d 498 (1971); Little v. Power Brake
Co., 255 N.C. 451, 121 S.E.2d 889 (1961); Doca v. Federal Stevedoring Co., 308
N.Y. 44, 123 N.E.2d 632 (1954); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Public Util. Comm'n,
163 Ohio St. 252, 126 N.E.2d 314 (1955); G.T. Harvey Co. v. Steele, 347 P.2d 802
(Okla. 1959); Cole v. New England Transp. Co., 88 R.I. 408, 149 A.2d 352 (1959);
Richards v. City of Columbia, 227 S.C. 538, 88 S.E.2d 683 (1955); Bean v. Hard-
ware Mut. Casualty Co., 349 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961); Hackford v. In-
dustrial Comm'n, 11 Utah 2d 312, 358 P.2d 899 (1961); Guiles v. Department of
Labor, 13 Wash 2d 605, 126 P.2d 195 (1942); Hoff v. State Compensation
Comm'n, 148 W. Va. 33, 132 S.E.2d 772 (1963); State ex rel. Ball v. McPhee, 6
Wis. 2d 190, 94 N.W.2d 711 (1959); Jennings v. C.M. & W. Drilling Co., 77 Wyo.
69, 307 P.2d 122 (1957). See also 1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW at
406-10 (1965); B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 117 (1976).
86. In Arizona and Maryland, courts have held that hearsay, standing
alone, may support an administrative finding. In Reynolds Metals Co. v. Indus.
Comm'n, 98 Ariz. 97, 402 P.2d 414 (1965), the Arizona Supreme Court rejected
the residuum rule and held that the commission may rely on hearsay where it is
the kind on which reasonable men are accustomed to rely in serious affairs. The
Reynolds court pointed out that "this objective [of preventing compensation
awards based on insubstantial evidence] can be better achieved by upholding
awards based on evidence that is technically hearsay, but of the persuasive
type, rather than on the mechanical requirement that there must be a residuum
of 'legal evidence' somewhere in the record." Id, at 102-03, 402 P.2d at 418.
As early as 1925, the Maryland Supreme Court upheld a workmen's compen-
sation award based on hearsay evidence in Standard Oil Co. v. Mealey, 147 Md.
249, 127 A. 850 (1925). The court rejected the residuum rule asserting that
"Wigmore . .. questions the propriety of 'the insistence that every part of the
evidence shall be tested by the jury trial rules of admissibility.' " Id at 253, 127
A. at 851. More recently, in Neuman v. Mayor of Baltimore, 251 Md. 92, 246
A.2d 583 (1968) the court held that in administrative proceedings, hearsay is not
only admissible but may serve as the sole basis for a decision if it is credible
and has sufficient probative force. Id at 97, 246 A.2d at 586. See Redding v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 263 Md. 94, 282 A.2d 136 (1971) (hearsay evidence
supported administrative body's decision sustaining dismissal of county police
officer); Eger v. Stone, 253 Md. 533, 253 A.2d 372 (1969) (in an administrative
proceeding on application for special exception for off-street parking, hearsay
evidence as to the number of accidents that had occurred in the area was of suf-
ficient credibility and probative force to be the sole basis for the decision).
California, Ohio and Virginia allow hearsay, standing alone, to support an ad-
ministrative decision in their workmen's compensation proceedings. See Hend-
ricks v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 25 Cal. App. 2d 534, 78 P.2d 189 (1938);
Sada V. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 11 Cal. 2d 263, 78 P.2d 1127 (1938); State
Compensation Ins. Fund v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 195 Cal. 174, 231 P. 996
(1924); Baker v. Industrial Comm'n, 44 Ohio App. 539, 186 N.E. 10 (1933);
Williams v. Fuqua, 199 Va. 709, 101 S.E.2d 562 (1958); Derby J. Swift & Co., 188
Va. 336, 49 S.E.2d 417 (1948); and American Furniture Co. v. Graves, 141 Va. 1,
126 S.E. 213 (1925).
Recent Decisions
other hand, the current trend in the federal courts has clearly
been to abandon the residuum rule. 7
In a 1938 Second Circuit case, NLRB v. Remington Rand,"8
Judge Learned Hand ruled that hearsay could support an admin-
istrative finding if it was "the kind of evidence on which respon-
sible persons are accustomed to rely in serious affairs."89 This
classic common sense standard has been followed by federal ad-
ministrative hearing officers and agencies for several years. 9
That same year, the United States Supreme Court, in Con-
solidated Edison Co. v. NLRB,91 announced the "substantial evi-
dence" rule which measures both the qualitative and quantitative
sufficiency of supporting evidence and evaluates whether such
evidence is substantial enough to support an administrative deci-
sion.9" Consolidated Edison created confusion, however, because
after appearing to reiterate Judge Hand's classic formulation,
the Court stated that "mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor
does not constitute substantial evidence. 93 Courts, especially
state appellate courts, have used the Consolidated Edison
language to incorporate the residuum rule into their application
of the "substantial evidence" rule. Consequently, administrative
trial examiners, in order to avoid possible error, are encouraged
to apply the residuum rule.94
The first major development that eroded the residuum rule in
federal administrative law was the passage of the APA in 1946."s
Section 556(d) of the APA provides that any evidence will be re-
ceived in an administrative proceeding as long as it is not irrele-
vant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious.". Under the APA stan-
87. See infra note 103.
88. 94 F.2d 862 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 576 (1938).
89. 94 F.2d at 873.
90. See MCCORMICK, supra note 19, § 351. See also Reynolds Metals Co. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 98 Ariz. 97, 402 P.2d 414 (1965) (Industrial Commission may
rely on hearsay where it is of the kind on which reasonable men are accustomed
to rely in serious affairs).
91. 305 U.S 197 (1938).
92. Id. at 229. See MCCORMICK, supra note 19, § 352 (discussion of the
substantial evidence rule). Substantial evidence is evidence "affording a
substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably
inferred." NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 299
(1939) (citations omitted). See also DAVIS, supra note 27, § 29.02.
93. 305 U.S. at 230.
94. See MCCORMICK, supra note 19, § 352.
95. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 404, 60 Stat. 237.
96. See supra note 36.
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dard, an examiner could no longer commit reversible error by
admitting hearsay evidence. This standard is significant because
four previous bills introduced at the same session of Congress re-
quired "competent" evidence to support a finding. 7 Section
556(d) of the APA, however, makes no reference to that term
and requires only reliable, probative, and substantial evidence. 8
The trend to abandon the residuum rule in the federal courts
continued with the Supreme Court's decision in Richardson v.
Perales9 The Perales Court held that written reports by licensed
physicians who had examined the claimant may be received as
evidence despite their hearsay character and the absence of
cross-examination. Even though the claimant's failure to sub-
poena the physicians, resulting in their unavailability to testify,
was an important factor in the Court's holding, 10 the Court im-
plied that the medical reports alone were "substantial evidence"
on which to base a finding.101 The most important aspect of the
Perales decision is its new interpretation of Chief Justice
Hughes' remark in Consolidated Edison that mere uncorrobor-
ated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.
The Perales Court deflated this remark by emphasizing that
Chief Justice Hughes did not suggest a blanket rejection of ad-
ministrative reliance on hearsay evidence.'
Although Perales came close to completely rejecting the resi-
duum rule, it fell short of doing so because the physicians were
not subpoenaed. However, more recent federal cases have disre-
garded this technicality and have relied on the Perales language
discrediting the residuum rule."3 Most post-Perales cases hold
97. See DAVIS, supra note 27, § 14.05.
98. See id; MCCORMICK, supra note 19, § 350.
99. 402 U.S. 389. See supra note 41.
100. 402 U.S. at 402.
101. Id at 399.
102. Id. at 407-08. The Perales Court stated:
The contrast the Chief Justice was drawing, at the very page cited, was
not with material that would be deemed formally inadmissible in judicial
proceedings but with material 'without a basis in evidence having rational
probative force.' This was not a blanket rejection by the Court of adminis-
trative reliance on hearsay irrespective of reliability and probative value.
The opposite was the case.
Id. (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 230 (1938)).
103. See Klinestiver v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 606 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (hearsay can constitute substantive evidence in support of a Drug En-
forcement Administration decision); United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v.
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that substantiality of evidence should be determined by apprais-
ing it in its full context, rejecting any technical rule that evi-
dence inadmissible in a jury trial is not substantial.'
One of the more important post-Perales decisions is School
Board v. HEW,10 in which the same court of appeals that was
reversed by the Supreme Court in Perales analyzed the overall
influence of the Perales decision on administrative agencies and
rejected the per se rule that hearsay can never constitute sub-
stantial evidence. The court held that one must look for factors
that assure reliability of hearsay evidence. ' " Recently, in
Johnson v. United States,'°7 the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia completely renounced the residuum
rule, holding that it no longer applies in administrative hearings
and rejected a per se rule that brands hearsay insubstantial. '°
In his concurring opinion in Ceja, Justice Roberts criticized
Justice Kauffman's reliance on Perales as authority for a general
rule of admissibility of all objected-to hearsay.' 9 Justice Roberts,
however, interpreted Perales in an extremely limited manner by
restricting its precedential use to those cases with identical
Webb, 595 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1979) (despite their hearsay nature and the
absence of cross-examination, reports of a radiologist and an examing physician
constituted substantial evidence of claimant's disability); Cartner v. Califano,
584 F.2d 1389 (8th Cir. 1978) (denial of disability benefits based on physician's
written observation was substantial evidence, pointing out claimant's opportuni-
ty to subpoena and cross-examine physician); Russell v. Secretary of HEW, 540
F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1976) (written report of examining physician can constitute
substantial evidence for determining disability under the Social Security Act);
Ressegive v. Secretary of HEW, 425 F. Supp. 160 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (reports of
treating physician regarding plaintiff's sickness constitute substantial evidence
even though not supported by any live testimony); McKee v. United States, 500
F.2d 525 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (in an administrative hearing "rank hearsay" is not only
admissible but can constitute substantial evidence); Reil v. United States, 456
F.2d 777 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (an agency could disbelieve live medical testimony and
credit hearsay medical reports). See also Zannino v. Arnold, 531 F.2d 687 (3d
Cir. 1976); Martin-Mendoza v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 499 F.2d 918
(9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1113 (1975); DiVosta Rentals, Inc. v. Lee,
488 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1973); Henley v. United States, 379 F. Supp. 1044 (M.D.
Pa. 1974); Wathen v. United States, 527 F.2d 1191 (Ct. Cl. 1975), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 821 (1976).
104. DAVIS, supra note 27, § 168.
105. 525 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1976).
106. Id at 905-06.
107. 628 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
108. Id at 190.
109. 493 Pa. at 617-18, 427 A.2d at 646-47, (Roberts, J., concurring).
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facts. 10 This limited application of Perales ignores the line of
post-Perales cases in the federal courts which has expanded its
holding to a variety of factual situations."'
The hearsay rule was designed to determine admissibility or
exclusion of evidence in cases tried before a jury. The residuum
rule uses the hearsay rule to evaluate evidence in non-jury ad-
ministrative proceedings. There are no rules of evidence, how-
ever, for non-jury trials,"' and judges sitting without juries exer-
cise wide discretion and often depart from jury trial rules."3
Because administrative agencies handle so many cases, requir-
ing them to follow the strict evidence rules of jury trials is im-
practical, unrealistic, and most importantly, counterproductive.
The courtroom rules of evidence were created for the settlement
of controversies, not the discovery of facts, which is the purpose
of most administrative hearings."' Furthermore, courtroom rules
were adopted to protect juries from being exposed to legally in-
competent evidence, not to protect agency examiners, who, like
judges are presumed to admit all relevant evidence and base
their decision only on what they deem to be reliable and proba-
tive evidence."5
The decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Ceja is
part of the current trend away from the residuum rule and re-
sponds to the strong criticism regarding the rule's ineffective-
ness. Ceja adopts new extremely flexible guidelines for evaluat-
ing hearsay in administrative proceedings. They are based upon
what Justice Kauffman termed a "simple common sense analysis"
that determines the reliability of hearsay evidence on a case-by-
case basis."6 The discretion that Ceja affords to agency ex-
110. Id.
111. See supra note 103.
112. See DAVIS, supra note 27, § 14.04.
113. See DAVIS, supra note 27, § 14.03 which states that "our evidence
system is indeed queer: we have rules of evidence for the less than 3 per cent
of trials that use juries but we have no rules of evidence for the more than 970/0
that are without juries." See also Davis, An Approach to Rules of Evidence for
Nonjury Cases, 50 A.B.A. J. 723 (1964).
114. Davis, Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364,
423-24 (1942).
115. See MCCORMICK, supra note 19, § 348.
116. 493 Pa. at 609, 427 A.2d at 642. This is a reversal from the strict resi-
duum rule which ignores the consequences of each case and determines the reli-
ability of hearsay solely on whether it is corroborated or not.
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aminers has long been advocated by legal scholars and is in line
with the liberal standard of the APA.117
Whether the "common sense" guidelines provided by Justice
Kauffman will improve administrative proceedings or only add
confusion to the whole administrative process is the key question
raised by the Ceja decision. Although Justice Roberts, concerned
with the due process rights of claimants, criticized what he con-
sidered Justice Kauffman's failure to provide guidance as to how
the new guidelines should be applied, Justice Kauffman's opinion
sets forth in explicit detail how referees are to apply his guide-
lines in order to safeguard the due process rights of claimants." 9
Moreover, Ceja exemplifies the protection which Justice Kauff-
man's guidelines afford claimants in administrative proceedings
because the application of these guidelines in Ceja resulted in
the court's finding that the referee's conduct at the hearing fell
far short of protecting the due process rights of the unrepre-
sented appellant.' 9
The "common sense" guidelines adopted in Ceja should pro-
vide a more adaptable, rational, and pragmatic standard for eval-
uating hearsay evidence than that existing under the rigid resi-
duum rule. Because Justice Kauffman's opinion was a plurality
opinion with all six justices agreeing in the result but equally
divided regarding the reasoning, it carries less precedential
weight than if it were a majority opinion. 2 ' For this reason, the
true effect of the Ceja decision will depend upon how future deci-
sions apply Justice Kauffman's guidelines.
George P. Faines
117. See supra note 36.
118. 493 Pa. at 610-12, 427 A.2d at 642-44.
119. Id. at 612-13, 427 A.2d at 644.
120. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
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